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Abstract. The adversarial vulnerability of deep networks has spurred
the interest of researchers worldwide. Unsurprisingly, like images, adver-
sarial examples also translate to time-series data as they are an inherent
weakness of the model itself rather than the modality. Several attempts
have been made to defend against these adversarial attacks, particularly
for the visual modality. In this paper, we perform detailed benchmarking
of well-proven adversarial defense methodologies on time-series data. We
restrict ourselves to the L∞ threat model. We also explore the trade-
off between smoothness and clean accuracy for regularization-based de-
fenses to better understand the trade-offs that they offer. Our analy-
sis shows that the explored adversarial defenses offer robustness against
both strong white-box as well as black-box attacks. This paves the way
for future research in the direction of adversarial attacks and defenses,
particularly for time-series data.
Keywords: Time-series · Deep learning · Adversarial attacks · Adver-
sarial defenses.
1 Introduction
Time-series data is ubiquitous in this era of internet-of-things (IoT) and in-
dustry 4.0 where millions of sensors are generating data at an extremely high
frequency [11,5,9,8]. With this increasing amount of data, there has been a wide-
scale deployment of deep models for time-series analysis. Deep learning models
have proven to be susceptible to changes in the input which can significantly
alter the predictions of the classifier [12]. This raises a serious concern over the
real-world deployment of these models. This vulnerability has been particularly
explored in the context of images [12,6,10,2].
A similar vulnerability exists also in the context of other modalities as this
is primarily a weakness of the current learning paradigm rather than the modal-
ity [12]. Since many of the time-series models are deployed security-critical sce-
narios, there has been an increasing interest regarding the robustness of these
models [11,5,9,8]. Therefore, gradient-based attacks prevalent in the computer-
vision community have also been translated to time-series data [11,5,9].
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Various defenses have been proposed to circumvent this adversarial vulnera-
bility [10,15,14]. Some of these defenses are specific to the visual modality, while
a wide range of literature has been focused on either training on these adversarial
examples or adding an additional regularization term that forces the predictions
to be consistent within a specific neighborhood of the example. In this paper,
we employ some of the most well-recognized defense methodologies tested on
images and evaluate their robustness for time-series data to establish a proper
benchmark.
2 Related Work
Adversarial examples were first discovered by Szegedy et al. (2013) [12] as a
consequence of trying to solve an inverse optimization problem. Since then, a
wide range of literature has focused on this security aspect including both de-
velopment of more sophisticated defenses as well as advances in attacks in order
to break these defenses.
Adversarial attacks can be mainly categorized into two different categories
namely white-box attacks and black-box attacks. White-box attacks assume ac-
cess to model architecture and parameters, therefore, they can effectively and
efficiently attack the model using the gradient information. Black-box attacks,
on the other hand, require access to either the output probabilities or even just
the label, making them more applicable in real-world settings. However, black-
box attacks usually require thousands or even millions of queries to the model
to compute just a single adversarial example.
Szegedy et al. (2013) [12] presented the first adversarial attack based on box-
constrained L-BFGS to mine adversarial examples. Goodfellow et al. (2014) [6]
proposed a fast version of the attack by assuming the linearity of classifiers
around the input. With this assumption, they were able to use a single step attack
based on the gradient which they named Fast Gradient-Sign Method (FGSM).
Madry et al. (2017) [10] proposed an iterative version of FGSM with a random
restart which they named Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) and claimed it to
be an optimal first-order adversary. Another famous attack is Carlini-Wagner [4]
attack. However, this is mainly designed for L2 norm-based attacks while we
only focus on L∞ norm-based attacks in this paper. Boundary attack [2] intro-
duced by Brendel et al. (2017) formed the basis for decision-based attacks where
the attacker assumes access only to the output label. SIMple Black-box Attack
(SIMBA) [7] proposed by Guo et al. (2019) greatly simplified the attack pipeline
by assuming access to the output probabilities of the model. The attack mines
adversarial examples by just randomly perturbing pixels if they have a negative
impact on the output probability.
As attacks have progressed, more and more sophisticated methods have been
developed to defend against these attacks. However, most of these attacks were
either shown to be masking the gradient or poorly tested [1]. One of the most
effective methods to defend against adversarial attacks is PGD-based adver-
sarial training [10]. The robust model is trained on the generated adversarial
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examples rather than the original inputs in this case. As PGD is one of the
most powerful white-box attacks, PGD-based adversarially trained models were
shown to be significantly superior in terms of robustness as compared to other
techniques [10,1]. Zhang et al. (2019) [15] proposed TRADES which uses an
additional regularization term along with the conventional cross-entropy loss
that minimizes the discrepancy between clean and adversarial predictions. Fea-
ture denoising [14] proposed by Zie et al. (2019) introduced additional denoising
operators in the network. The whole network was then trained using adversar-
ial training [10]. The idea was based on minimizing the discrepancy between
the feature maps of a clean and adversarial example. A large fraction of ad-
versarial defense literature has been focused on provable defenses that provide
formal guarantees against the worst-case adversary. However, they are usually
prohibitively slow and unable to scale to large datasets [13]. We don’t include
these methods in our comparison and leave it as future work.
Minor efforts have also been made in terms of extending these attacks for
time-series data. Siddiqui et al. (2019) [11] showed that gradient-based adversar-
ial attacks were effective for both time-series classification as well as time-series
regression networks. Fawaz et al. (2019) [5] analyzed a range of different time-
series datasets and showed that deep models trained on time-series data are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Both these papers only explore the vulnerabil-
ity of networks, which is not surprising given that adversarial attacks exploit the
machine learning optimization framework, rather than a specific modality [6].
Karim et al. (2020) [9] and Harford et al. (2020) [8] employed Gradient Adver-
sarial Transformation Network (GATN) for attacking models. Since they also
considered classical time-series models that are non-differentiable, they used a
knowledge distillation approach to train a student network mimicking the predic-
tions of the original classifier. Therefore, what they explored were just transfer
attacks which are a rather weak form of black-box attacks. On the other hand,
we evaluate using both the strongest white-box as well as black-box attacks to
truly establish the robustness of the evaluated defenses. Our work specifies a
proper threat model when evaluating against attacks as well as considers both
strong white-box and black-box attacks which haven’t been explored in the con-
text of time-series data. Therefore, we not only benchmark adversarial defenses
but also establish a benchmark for strong adversarial attacks to be considered
for future work which has been missing in the prior work [3].
3 Method
3.1 Threat Model
The threat model specifies the conditions under which the considered defense
is designed to be secure [3]. We consider L∞ threat model and use an epsilon
of 0.3 for training robust models. There are no box-constraints for time-series
data due to their variable input range in contrast to the visual modality where
the pixels take on a discrete value from [0, 255]. Therefore, in our case, the data
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was normalized with zero-mean and unit standard deviation which justified the
choice of 0.3 as the epsilon value.
3.2 Adversarially Robust Models (using Adversarial Defenses)
A robust model is a model which is robust against these minor corruptions of
the input signal. A robust model is usually obtained by training a model with
a particular adversarial defense methodology. There is a very wide range of
literature on the topic of adversarial defenses. However, most of these defenses
were shown to be broken by a stronger attack [1]. Therefore, we only explored
defenses that withstood these attacks when evaluated on images. We will now
discuss each of the evaluated defenses in detail.
Adversarial training Madry et al. (2017) [10] proposed a robust optimization
algorithm which they named as adversarial training. Adversarial training is one
of the most simple and widely accepted adversarial defenses in the literature.
The idea is to just train a classifier on the attacked examples rather than the
original ones. As the model inherently learns to be robust to these attacks during
training, this naturally re-configures the decision boundaries of the network.
w∗ = arg min
w
arg max
x′∈Bp(x,)
L(Φ(x′;w), y′)
where y′ indicates the model’s prediction on the input x. The maximization
problem is approximately solved by generating an adversarial example using the
PGD attack which is considered to be the optimal first-order adversary [10].
The biggest advantage of adversarial training is that there are no additional
hyperparameters making model training very easy and convenient.
TRADES Zhang et al. (2019) [15] introduced TRADES which smoothens the
predictions of the classifier around the input by employing an additional term
in the final objective alongside the conventional cross-entropy.
w∗ = arg min
w
{
LCE(Φ(x;w), y) + arg max
x′∈Bp(x,)
LKL(Φ(x;w), Φ(x′;w))/λ
}
where LCE represents the conventional cross-entropy loss on clean data while
LKL computes the KL-divergence between the logits obtained from the original
example and the computed adversarial example. The maximization problem is
again approximately solved by generating an adversarial example using the PGD
attack. TRADES introduces an additional hyperparameter λ which controls the
trade-off between clean accuracy and adversarial robustness.
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Feature Denoising Xie et al. (2019) [14] introduced the idea of feature denois-
ing based on their observation that the feature maps computed for an adversarial
example are significantly noiser than the ones computed for the original image.
Therefore, in order to circumvent this problem, they used denoising operators
before max-pooling layers in their network. They compared different denoising
operators, and found Gaussian Non-Local Means (GNLM) to be the most effec-
tive one. This can be represented as:
yi =
1∑
∀j∈N f(xi, xj)
∑
∀j∈N
f(xi, xj)× xj
where yi denotes the i
th output, N denotes all the spatial locations on the
feature map and f(xi, xj) captures the similarity between xi and xj . Since we
use the Gaussian version of non-local means, the similarity function is given
by f(xi, xj) = e
1√
d
θ(xi)
tφ(xj) where θ(xi) ∈ R64 and φ(xj) ∈ R64 represents two
embedded versions of the input implemented via 1×1 convolution, and d denotes
the number of channels. Based on their findings, we also introduce an additional
GLNM denoising layer before every pooling layer in all of our networks. Since
this denoising layer is also learned during adversarial training, we compare it’s
impact when training the model using different adversarial defense techniques.
3.3 Robust Evaluation (using Adversarial Attacks)
The aim of robust evaluation is to precisely identify the robustness of the trained
robust model. Carlini et al. [3] provided comprehensive guidelines to evaluate
robust models in order to avoid pitfalls which prior defense methods could not
avoid, providing a false sense of security. For this reason, we included two major
black-box as well as two major white-box attacks to compare. In total, we used
5 different attacks, where one black-box attack i.e. noise attack is a rather weak
attack, but serves as a trivial baseline.
Evaluation Metric
There are many different choices when evaluating robust models. This includes
the input examples to consider as well as the target to use for computing the
adversarial example. In our case, we compute robust accuracy on all examples
regardless of whether they were correctly classified or not. We always conduct
attack using the original labels instead of the model’s prediction in order to en-
sure that the attack does not mistakenly move an incorrectly classified example
to a correct class, providing a false sense of robustness. However, regardless of
the choice of this metric, the key takeaways from our experiments still remain
the same. We evaluate robustness using untargeted attacks as they can be con-
sidered worst-case adversaries. Targeted attacks are usually much more relevant
in practice but harder to find as compared to untargeted attacks.
White-box Attacks
FGSM [6]: Goodfellow et al. (2014) [6] posited that the lack of robustness
of deep models is due to their linear nature. Therefore, they used this linear
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approximation to develop a Fast Gradient-Sign based attack Method (FGSM)
which takes just a single step in the direction pointed by the gradient.
xa = x+  sign
( ∂
∂x
L(Φ(x;w), y))
where y can either be the original label or the model’s prediction, and sign
returns the sign of the gradient. We used 100 random restarts for FGSM-100
and picked the best adversarial example from these 100 restarts.
PGD [10]: Projected-Gradient Descent (PGD) is an iterative version of FGSM
with an additional random restart.
x(t+1)a = Clipx,
{
x(t)a + α sign
( ∂
∂x
(t)
a
L(Φ(x(t)a ;w), y)
)}
where α is per-step update size, Clipx, binds the L∞ norm of the perturbation
to be , and x
(t)
a indicates the adversarial example obtained after the tth opti-
mization step. In the case of PGD, x
(0)
a = x+δ where δ is a random perturbation
within the L∞ norm-ball. We used 10 random restarts for PGD-10 and picked
the best adversarial example from these 10 restarts. Each every restart, we use
100 PGD steps with α = 2× /T where T is the number of PGD steps.
Black-box Attacks
Noise Attack: One of the most simple and preliminary attacks is the random
noise attack. The idea is to generate a set of random vectors and pick the best
one out of them. We used a set of 100 random vectors for NOISE-100.
Boundary Attack [2]: Boundary attack was the first decision-based attack. It
starts with a random input that is not classified as the given label y and walks
towards the original input until it hits the decision boundary. At this point, the
attack starts moving orthogonal to the decision boundary until it encounters the
closest attainable point to the given example x. Boundary attack minimizes the
L2 norm of perturbation, therefore, it is not particularly optimized for the L∞
models that we consider in our case. In order to compute the robust accuracy
metric that we report, we compute the L∞ norm of the computed perturbation
and then discard any perturbations which exceed this budget. Therefore, in many
cases, although being a powerful attack when considering euclidean distances, it
does not provide high success rates when evaluated on L∞ norm.
Simple Black-box Attack (SIMBA) [7]: SIMBA is one of the most simple
black-box attacks which uses the predicted probabilities from the classifier to
decide the perturbation vector. SIMBA attack considers all of the input points
in the sequence and computes their impact on the probability of the predicted
class if perturbed by either {−, }. It then chooses perturbation, whichever
maximally reduces the probability of the predicted class. If the probability of
the predicted class is not impacted by the chosen input point, the attack leaves
it intact, hence, it also minimizes the L0 norm of the perturbation. The number
of input points queried to compute the adversarial example is restricted when
considering high-dimensional images in order to make the attack time efficient.
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(a) CT (b) AT [10] (c) TR [15]
(d) CT + GNLM [14] (e) AT [10] + GNLM [14] (f) TR [15] + GNLM [14]
Fig. 1: Adversarial robustness curves computed for the different robust models
using five different attacks. CT stands for conventional training, AT stands for
adversarial training, TR stands for TRADES, and GNLM stands for Gaussian
Non-Local Means.
However, we did not impose any such restrictions as the number of points in a
sequence is usually smaller in contrast to the number of pixels in an image.
3.4 Dataset
Due to lack of space, we only present results on the famous character trajecto-
ries dataset3. We also experimented with several other datasets and found the
results to be consistent between these different datasets. The character trajecto-
ries dataset contains hand-written characters using a Wacom tablet. Only three
dimensions are kept for the final dataset which includes x, y and pen-tip force.
The sampling rate was set to be 200 Hz. The data was numerically differenti-
ated and Gaussian smoothen with σ = 2. The task is to classify the characters
into 20 different classes. This dataset is comprised of 2858 character samples
divided into 1383 training, 606 validation and 869 test sequences. Each sequence
is comprised of 206 time-steps with three channels. Since we need to constrain
the input range for precisely defining the epsilon norm-ball to consider within
our attack and defense framework, we normalize the data to have zero mean and
unit standard deviation.
4 Results
Our main results are presented in Fig. 1. We report the robust accuracy of the
classifier considering different attack methods on a range of different epsilon val-
ues starting from 0.05 to 0.3 with an increment of 0.05. These plots precisely
3 https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Character+Trajectories
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(a) 1/λ = 0.01 (b) 1/λ = 0.01 + GNLM (c) 1/λ = 0.05
(d) 1/λ = 0.05 + GNLM (e) 1/λ = 0.1 (f) 1/λ = 0.1 + GNLM
(g) 1/λ = 0.5 (h) 1/λ = 0.5 + GNLM (i) 1/λ = 1.0
(j) 1/λ = 1.0 + GNLM (k) 1/λ = 5.0 (l) 1/λ = 10.0
Fig. 2: Impact of hyperparameters on the robustness curves for TRADES.
capture the robustness of the model against adversarial attacks of different mag-
nitudes. Since we trained a range of different TRADES models using different
values of 1/λ, we only report the best one out here, and explore the impact
of these hyperparameters later in Section 4.2. It is evident from the plot that
conventional training results in poor robustness against these attacks, almost
reducing the classifier’s accuracy to 0% when considering the worst-case adver-
sary. However, when using defense methodologies such as adversarial training or
TRADES, the model gains robustness against both white-box as well as black-
box attacks with a slightly detrimental effect on the clean accuracy of the model.
4.1 Quantifying the Impact of Denoising Operators
Fig. 1 also presents a comparison of using Gaussian Non-Local Means (GNLM)
as a denoising operator alongside the use of different training schemes. Using
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Table 1: Clean accuracy of the different models
Defense 1/λ Denoising Operator Train Accuracy Test Accuracy
- - - 100.00% 98.16%
- - GNLM [14] 100.00% 97.35%
Adversarial Training [10] - - 99.13% 95.40%
Adversarial Training [10] - GNLM [14] 98.70% 94.71%
TRADES [15] 0.01 - 99.49% 95.63%
TRADES [15] 0.01 GNLM [14] 99.93% 97.93%
TRADES [15] 0.05 - 99.71% 97.47%
TRADES [15] 0.05 GNLM [14] 99.57% 98.39%
TRADES [15] 0.1 - 99.42% 97.70%
TRADES [15] 0.1 GNLM [14] 99.71% 97.81%
TRADES [15] 0.5 - 99.13% 95.86%
TRADES [15] 0.5 GNLM [14] 89.08% 90.10%
TRADES [15] 1.0 - 98.77% 95.05%
TRADES [15] 1.0 GNLM [14] 98.70% 95.05%
TRADES [15] 5.0 - 96.02% 90.10%
TRADES [15] 5.0 GNLM [14] - -
TRADES [15] 10.0 - 92.99% 88.61%
TRADES [15] 10.0 GNLM [14] 93.42% 87.46%
denoising operator with conventional training results in inferior adversarial per-
formance along with inferior clean accuracy (98.16% vs 97.35%) since the fea-
tures are not optimized for this denoising operator. There is a slight drop in
clean accuracy when switching from adversarial training to adversarial train-
ing with a denoising operator (95.40% vs 94.71%) alongside a minor drop in
terms of robustness. This drop in robustness is primarily a consequence of the
initial drop in clean accuracy as our evaluation metric is directly impacted by
such changes. This drop is permissible for ImageNet classifiers where the accu-
racy even after adversarial training is only 35% [14]. However, for time-series
datasets where the initial accuracy is already high, GNLM shows a detrimental
effect on performance.
In contrast, when using TRADES, the accuracy of the classifier remains
the same with and without the denoising operator. The denoising operator also
positively impacts the robustness of the model. In comparison to adversarial
training, there is no impact on clean accuracy when using TRADES with 1/λ =
1.0. Table 1 summarizes the clean accuracies of the model under different settings
for a direct comparison.
4.2 Sensitivity to Regularization Hyperparameters
Fig. 2 visualizes the robustness curves for different values of the hyperparameter
1/λ used when training the robust model using TRADES. We also list the clean
accuracies of the models in Table 1 for a direct comparison. It is evident from the
table and the figure that higher regularization leads to lower clean accuracy as
expected alongside higher robustness against adversarial attacks. It is important
to note that the network failed to converge in many cases when using 1/λ > 1.0
and GNLM denoising operator.
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(a) NOISE-100 (b) FGSM-100 (c) PGD-10
(d) Boundary [2] (e) SIMBA [7]
Fig. 3: Generated adversarial examples using an  of 0.3. The original signal is
highlight using a solid line while the attacked signal is represented using different
line styles. The shaded area highlights the difference between the two signals.
4.3 Attacked Examples
Fig. 3 presents a particular example from the character trajectories dataset on
the undefended model. We visualized examples generated from a rather high
value of epsilon i.e. 0.3. This is to ensure that the differences between different
attacks are properly highlighted. It is interesting to note that all attacks changed
the label to the same target class 3 indicating that the two classes are similar
in the feature space. Almost all attacks exhausted the L∞ perturbation budget
except for boundary and SIMBA attack as boundary attack minimizes the L2
norm of the perturbation while SIMBA additionally minimizes the L0 norm of
the perturbation alongside the L∞ norm.
5 Conclusion
This paper establishes an important benchmark regarding the robustness of time-
series classification models trained using different adversarial defense techniques.
Our analysis shows that the defenses evaluated for visual modality provide sim-
ilar robustness against adversarial attacks on time-series data.
Future work should be mainly targeted towards the evaluation of these ad-
versarial attacks for regression networks. While it is easy to quantify the impact
in terms of success rate for classification networks, this is much harder to report
when considering real-valued outputs. Another important direction is to com-
pare provable robustness methods on time-series data and evaluate their efficacy
as compared to the defenses considered here.
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